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Why	only	few	remember	the	Enough	Food	If	campaign
In	2013,	Enough	Food	If	was	the	first	campaign	coalition	since	Make	Poverty	History	in	2005.	Yet
while	many	recall	the	latter,	few	do	the	former,	despite	around	200	NGOs	having	been	involved	in	the
2013	campaign.	Graham	Harrison	explains	some	of	the	reasons	behind	this	failure	to	make	an
impression	on	the	public	memory.
In	2013,	the	major	international	development	NGOs	led	a	campaign	coalition	that	aimed	to	be	as	big
as	other	landmark	global	poverty	campaign	moments	such	as	Make	Poverty	History	or	Jubilee	2000.
During	its	construction,	those	who	led	the	campaign	declared	that	it	would	be	a	major	public	event	with	ambitious
goals.	The	campaign	was	called	Enough	Food	If.	The	fact	that	many	–	most?	–	readers	will	not	recall	the	campaign
is	intriguing	and	raises	key	questions	regarding	the	role	of	development	NGOs	and	the	campaigns	they	advocate.
Enough	Food	If	failed	to	make	an	impression	on	the	public	memory.	Why?	The	key	to	answering	this	question	is,
intriguingly,	its	success.	Success	can	be	a	tricky	thing	and	in	this	particular	case,	it	came	at	a	significant	cost.
First,	a	little	context.	Big	development	NGOs	like	Oxfam	and	Save	the	Children	have	been	thinking	about	how	to
make	an	impression	on	a	broad	British	public	since	the	massive	public	profile	they	achieved	through	Make	Poverty
History.	But,	at	the	same	time,	there	was	a	good	deal	of	trepidation	of	trying	to	repeat	Make	Poverty	History.	A	key
reason	for	this	was	that,	although	successful	in	achieving	massive	public	prominence,	Make	Poverty	History	left	a
difficult	legacy	for	coalition	building.	Most	coalition	members	went	through	a	difficult	set	of	reflections	about	Make
Poverty	History’s	effects	on	the	sector	more	broadly.
As	a	result,	NGOs	wanted	to	project	their	message,	understood	that	this	meant	creating	some	kind	of	coalition	to
amplify	voice,	but	were	not	sure	how	to	do	it.	Leading	development	NGOs	very	concerned	to	ensure	that	whatever
they	did,	it	would	be	perceived	as	a	success	and	this	set	a	tone	of	conservatism	and	moderation	from	the	beginning.
Enough	Food	If	was	designed	in	a	particular	way	in	order	to	write	success	into	its	procedures.	Most	importantly,	it
wanted	to	align	its	goals	as	closely	as	possible	to	those	held	by	the	Conservative-led	coalition	government.	Indeed,
the	campaign’s	origins	derived	from	the	‘hunger	summit’	hosted	by	David	Cameron	after	the	Olympics	in	2012.	And,
leaders	within	the	campaign	consulted	the	government	as	it	established	itself	and	set	its	goals:	a	coalition	of
coalitions.
Subsequently,	key	themes	developed	through	the	campaign’s	‘asks’	were	substantially	similar	to	the	international
development	agenda	being	articulated	by	the	Coalition	Government	and	especially	David	Cameron.	The	Enough
Food	If	campaign	themes	were	tax,	aid,	land,	and	transparency.	International	taxation	reform,	defending	aid,	and
promoting	transparency	were	at	the	heart	of	every	statement	Cameron	made	on	international	development	and	his
motif	of	a	‘golden	thread’.	The	only	distinct	campaign	issue	was	land,	and	this	articulated	mainly	through	a	concern
with	‘transparency’	which	was	Cameron’s	main	point	of	reference	throughout	his	development	communications.	It
was	also	most	as	if	the	second	clause	in	the	campaign’s	suggestive	name	was:	Enough	Food	If…	the	Coalition
government	achieves	its	development	vision	and	manages	to	get	other	G8	governments	on	board	in	the	process.
The	problem	here	is	that	the	campaign	had	little	sense	of	ambition,	risk,	or	distinct	identity	from	a	government
leadership	that	was	moderately	interested	in	a	moderate	vision	for	international	development.	As	a	result,	success
seemed	likely	and	also	rather	unremarkable.	The	lack	of	adversarialism	and	distinct	ambition	was	both	a	way	to
secure	a	success	narrative	and	to	make	that	narrative	entirely	unremarkable.
This	securing	of	success	was	manifest	in	other	ways:	the	campaign	was	short,	rather	loosely-managed,	and	very
generalised.	It	allowed	any	organisation	to	get	on	board	and	required	little	from	them	and	almost	no	difficult
intellectual	and	political	discussions	about	campaign	identity	and	politics.	There	was	a	gathering	in	Hyde	Park	but
little	attention	to	the	decisions	made	at	the	G8	meeting	a	week	later.	The	campaign	coalition’s	statements	after	the
G8	were	general	and	supportive.	Within	the	coalition,	statements	were	made	about	the	success	of	the	campaign,
none	of	which	raised	questions	about	the	low	level	of	ambition	or	lack	of	distinctiveness	of	the	campaign.
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There	is	a	balance	to	be	struck	in	any	campaign	mobilisation.	The	more	likely	success	seems,	the	less	like	that	it	is
worth	winning.	Across	a	whole	range	of	campaigns	throughout	British	history,	it	is	the	long-fought,	highly-ambitious,
politically	contested,	and	complex	campaigns	that	are	remembered,	including	popular	suffrage,	anti-apartheid,	and
Drop	the	Debt.	Even	campaigns	that	have	ostensibly	failed	have	left	significant	footprints	on	the	political	issues	they
engaged	with:	nuclear	disarmament,	anti-war,	climate	change	protests,	Global	Social	Fora,	Occupy.
You	need	ambition,	risk,	and	political	contention	to	generate	campaigns	worth	winning	and	remembering.	In	this
sense,	the	Enough	Food	If	campaign	was	not	worth	winning	or	remembering.
_______
Note:	the	above	draws	on	the	author’s	published	work	in	the	British	Journal	of	Politics	and	International	Relations.
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